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This paper identifies obstacles hindering the transformation
of centrally-planned economies (CPEs) into well-functioning
market economies. The analysis is motivated by the recent
experience with economic transformation and restructuring in
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. The economic system in CPEs is
highly distorted. Prices do not represent real social costs,
incentives systems are absent, losses of unprofitable state-owned
enterprises are automatically financed, legislations vital for
the functioning of markets are not in place, private ownership
and property rights are underdeveloped, bankruptcy laws are
absent, markets are missing, shortages prevail and, occasionally,
inflation is high.
The obstacles identified relate to (i) anticipatory
dynamics, (ii) monetary overhang and the budget, and (iii)
underdeveloped credit markets. It is demonstrated that these
obstacles inhibit the effectiveness of price reform, monetary and
credit policies, and trade liberalization. The analysis focuses
on various ways to remove the obstacles. In this regard, a
special examination is made of the implications of cleaning the
balance sheets of enterprises and banks from nonperforming loans,
as well as ways to enhance credibility. In the absence of such
measures, privatization will be difficult since the necessary
information about creditworthiness of firms is lacking. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of sequencing, safety
nets. and their associated obstacles.
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and NEERThis paper identifies obstacles hindering the transformation of
centrally-planned economies (CPEs) into well-functioning market economies.
The analysis is motivated by the recent experience with economic
transformation and restructuring in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. The
economic system in CPEs is highly distorted. Prices do not represent real
social costs, incentives systems are absent, losses of unprofitable state-
owned enterprises sre automatically financed, legislations vital for the
functioning of markets are not in place, private ownership and property
rights are underdeveloped, bsnkruptcy laws are absent, markets are missing,
shortages prevail and, occasionally, inflstion is high.
During the transition period the old central-planning system is
dismantled (or is collapsing) while the new market system (and its
associated institutions and policies) is still not in place. During this
transition, the economy is not any more a CPE but has not yet become a
fully-functioning market economy- -itis referred to as being a "previously
centrally-planned economy" (PCPE).
The obstacles identified in subsequent sections relate to (i)
anticipatory dynamics, (ii) monetary overhang and the budget, and (iii)
underdeveloped credit markets. We demonstrate how thase obstacles inhibit
the effectiveness of price reform, monetary and credit policies, and trade
liberalization. We explore various ways to remove the obstacles. In this
regard, we examine the implications of "cleaning" the balance sheets of
enterprises and banks from nonperforming loans, as well as ways to enhance
credibility. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of sequencing,
"safety nets," and their associated obstacles.-2-
1.Anticipatory dynamics
The proceas of economic tranaformation and restructuring is long and
complex. The pre-reform period typically starts with a lengthy delay
between the tiae of the political decision to launch a transformation
program, and the time of its actual implementation. During this pre-reform
period, economic policies are negotiated and designed, political consensus
is cemented, and key features of the institutional infrastructure are
developed. In the pre-reform period actual policy reform measures are not
yet implemented, and many of the basic features of the economic system are
still of the CPE variety. However, the private sector, being clearly aware
that fundamental changes are planned, modifiea the patterns of its
consumption and assets holdings. As illustrated by the recent experience in
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the U.S.S.R., the private sector's
behavior during the pre-reform period is governed by the expectations of the
reform rather than by the policy measures themselvea. Such anticipatory
actions reflect themselves in prices, exchange rates, rates of interest,
foreign exchange reaervea and other important economic variables.
Such anticipatory changes are not without cost. Since many of them
occur prior to the removal of administered prices, they may aggravate the
welfare cost of existing distortions. In addition, since the private sector
and policymakers are not fully familiar with the workings of market forces,
they may get confused observing that key economic variables exhibit sharp
changes, while economic fundamentals (policy measures and institutions) have
not yet changed. Faced with these realities, policymakera, whose mentality
and attitude mmy still reflect the legacy of central planners, may betempted to offset the undesirable consequences of anticipatory dynamics.
However, in order to succeed in offsetting such disruptions, policymakers
would need to adopt an extremely complex fine-tuning strategy requiring a
detailed and precise knowledge of the economic system. Since such knowledge
cannot be assumed, the fine-tuning strategy is likely to add to the "noise"
in the economic system, amplify the confusion, and erode credibility (Calvo
and Frenkel (1991a)).
These considerations suggest that the transitional pre-reform period
characterizing the early stages of transformation should be as short as
possible. The most effective way to remove the obstacle of anticipatory
dynaaics is through quick articulation and implementation of the program- -
therebyreducing the likelihood that anticipatory dynamics aggravates the
distortions- -and through the adoption of clear policy rules- -thereby enhance
credibility and reduce the likelihood of noisy fine-tuning.
2.Monetary overhang and the budget
One of the features of PCPEs, especially during the early stages of
transformation, is the presence of a "monetary overhang." Thia overhang has
accumulated over the years. Governments in the CPEa have financed their
budget deficits through money creation, and enterprises have enjoyed "soft"
budget constraints as losses were automatically financed through credit
creation. At the same time, the shortages of goods were not allowed to
result in an open inflation, which was suppressed by the governments'
adainistered-pricing strategy.-4-
Saddled with tha monetary overhang, transactions in the economy became
inefficient, as individuals have spent excessive time and resources in
"chasing" goods and standing in queues, rather than engaging themselves in
socially-productive activities. This has disrupted the production process
as workers and managers have had to divide their attention between their
jobs and "shopping" activities. Furthermore, the shortages reduced the
ability to exchange money for goods, eroded the liquidity and "moneyness" of
money, and encouraged costly barter transactions. Thus, the overhang
distorts the allocation of resources. In addition, it is an obstacle to the
adoption of other desirable measures like price liberalization and currency
convertibility.
There are essentially three mechanisms to reduce the liquidity
overhang. First, by increasing the attractiveness of domestic liquid assets
through a rise in the rate of interest paid on domestic-currency deposits;
second, through a rise in prices associated with the price liberalization;
and, third, through a reduction in liquidity. The first mechanism raises
the demand for real liquid assets, while the latter two lower their real
supply. These mechanisms have been emphasized in the recent debate on the
means to reduce the monetary overhang in the U.S.S.R., and, to some extent,
in Bulgaria and Romania. In what follows, we argue that a successful
implementation of each of the above-mentioned mechanisms must overcome some
of the obstacles related to tax incidence.
Regarding the first mechanism, we note that a rise in the deposit rate
(especially in PCPEs) has adverse implications for the government budget.
In such economies the banking system is "owned" to a large extent by the-5-
government. Therefore, a rise in the rate of interest paid by banks is a
drain on the budget. In fact, in many respects bank deposits may be
regarded es public debt, snd interest on deposits may be viewed as public-
debt service. From this perspective, credit and budget policies are linked
to each other, as the rise in the deposit rete needs to be financed through
new tsxes. The budgetary drain is higher, the lower is the interest
elasticity of the demand for reel liquid assets. The effectiveness of this
mechanism in alleviating the overhang depends on the capacity of the tax
system to generate the necessary tax revenue, and on the distributive end
efficiency implications of the associated incidence of the tax.
The second mechanism for eliminating the monetary overhang- -a rise in
the price level- -carries with it the danger of igniting inflation.
Therefore, the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the capacity of
the government to prevent the slippage of what should be a once-end-for-all
price rise into en inflation spiral. Furthermore, since the rise in the
price level represents a tax on the real value of domestic liquid asset, its
desirability also depends upon the specific incidence of the tax, end on its
effects on the efficiency of resource allocation, and on the capacity of the
government to secure its political support.
The third mechanism for eliminating the monetary overhang is a
reduction in the nominal stock of money. This reduction can be effected
through either e direct confiscation of money (e.g., e monetary reform), or
en absorption of money by open market sales. Each of these two methods
confronts important obstecles.-6-
Monetary reform may be highly effective in bringing about a rapid
elimination of the overhang. Indeed, there have been several historical
episodes in which such reforms were implemented successfully, especially in
the context of a comprehensive program dealing with hyperinflation.
However, since the incidence of the tax associated with a monetary reform is
not distributed evenly across the population, it may erode the political
support necessary for its successful implementation. Safety nets in the
form of appropriate income policies may need to be designed to secure the
political support. Furthermore, the direction of the effects of this
confiscatory policy (along with the accompanying income policies) on
economic efficiency and on credibility is not unambiguous.
The reduction of liquidity through open market sales also confronts
obstacles. In PCPEs the possibility of conducting open market sales are
limited by the absence of conventional financial instruments and by
underdeveloped capital markets. However, since the government owns a large
portion of the economy's assets and, in many cases, wishes to undertake a
privatization program, it can absorb the excess liquidity through sales of
houses and state enterprises. In addition, the increased size of the market
economy resulting from such privatization may raise the demand for liquidity
and reduce the size of the overhang as transactions shift from the barter to
the monetized sector.
The obstacles to privatization are well known (see, for example,
Borensztein and Kuaar(1991),Frydman and Rapaczynski (1990) and Lipton and
Sschs (1990)). They include the problems of establishing a "fair" market
price for an enterprise without the help of a well-functioning market place,-7-
developing the legal infrastructure necessary for the effective use of
entrepreneurial drive, adopting bankruptcy laws, developing domestic credit
and financial markets necessary for intermediation, the redistribution of
rents, the potential for corruption, etc.
In addition, privatization has profound implications on the budget, and
its effectiveness also depends on the incidence of the tax. On the one
hand, sales of state enterprises generate (nonrecurring) revenue (which
cannot be spent for, otherwise, a new monetary overhang would be generated);
on the other, the transfer of income-producing assets to the private sector
results in a (recurring) loss of future revenue. To make up for this loss
of revenue the government must find new sources of recurring income.
In searching for such new sources, the obstacle of "time inconsistency"
needs to be overcome. The government will be tempted to levy new
(previously unannounced) taxes on the enterprises that were just sold to the
private sector. The strategy of levying such surprise taxes, however, may
prove to be counterproductive. For, potential buyers, in setting their bids
for state enterprises, will take into account the possibility that the
government will be tespted to raise taxes. Such anticipations tend,
therefore, to lower the market price of state enterprises, reduce the
proceeds from privatizstion, end leave the monetary-overhang problem
unsolved. To prevent the erosion of privatization proceeds, the government
must provide reliable and believable signals that such surprise taxes will
not be levied. To produce such credible signals, the government must
demonstrate its capacity and unequivocal commitment to tap jgsourcesof
tax revenue. These new sources of tax revenue must cover the entire loss of-8-
recurrent revenue induced by the privatization program, thereby reducing the
likelihood that, after the event, the government would levy new taxes. To
reduce uncertainty such sources of revenue should be secured prior to
privatization. The privatization program will succeed in eliminating the
monetary overhang if the government replaces the lost revenue by levying new
taxes on entities other than the newly-privatized enterprises.
Similar considerations apply to proposals of absorbing the monetary
overhang by sales of housing. Unless the government reduces significantly
the rent-control provisions, there will not be great incentives for tenants,
who pay ridiculously low rents, to offer high price for housing. Thus, the
reduction in the rent-control provisions represent a specific incidence of
the tax (falling entirely on the tenants). The adoption of such a tax,
however, signifies a major political obstacle.
The foregoing analysis of the various means to eliminate monetary
overhang reveals that in all cases the private sector ends up being taxed by
the full amount of the overhang. The choice among the alternative means
would reflect the relative desirability of the differenr incidence of the
tax.
3. Credit markets and economic transformation
The difficulties associsted with the early phases of transformation
reflect the unprecedented changes in the policy environment superimposed on
the collapsing central-planning system. The fundamental transformation
induces large-scale dislocations as inefficient sectors are expected to get
out of business, while other sectors are expected to expand in response to
market incentives. In addition, faced by market prices and positive real-9-
interest rates, enterprises thst accumulated large inventories under the
administered-price/low-interest-rate regime ere likely to find their
inventories stock to be excessive. While running down inventories,
production declines (as firms sell from inventories rather than from new
production) end the demand facing inventory-producing firms falls.
In this section we focus on the special role played by credit and
financial markets, and argue that the imperfections prevailing in PCPEs are
major obstacles to an effective transformation. They can give rise to a
"bad" equilibrium in which growth is low and the incentives to undertake
efficient investments are stifled. We also argue that the removal of these
obstacles yields a distinctly superior "good" equilibrium.
To motivate the analysis, it is worth recalling the main features of
credit and financial markets in PCPEs. These markets lack depth and
breadth. The complex information system necessary to assess risk and
creditworthiness is underdeveloped. For, in the past, while being a CPE
there were no incentivea to accumulate such information. In the CPE losses
of enterprises were automatically financed and the government, being a
"lender of last resort," provided comprehensive insurance without charging
the appropriate premium. In many cases this implicit insurance also
encouraged overextension of interenterprise credit.
The interdependence among the balance sheets of enterprises is one of
the key obstacles impeding the operation of the market system. It makes it
very difficult to distinguish between enterprises that are efficient and
viable and those that are inefficient and nonviable, thereby adding to the
complexity of assessing creditworthiness of individual firms. The lack of- 10-
informationis especially pronounced, since the dramatic structural changes
associated with the transformation process in PCPEa render the limited
available information largely obsolete. Furthermore, in PCPEs policymakers
are typically untested, the structure of property rights is not fully
defined, and the private sector is unaccustomed to "market rules." These
factors contribute to the uncertainty about policy response, and about the
behavior of economic agents. The overall uncertainty is likely to affect
adversely the profitability of enterprises, to reduce the market value of
installed capital and, thus, to limit the capacity of enterprises to borrow
against collateralized capital.
The imperfect information structure which makes it difficult to assess
the creditworthiness of enterprises, superimposed on the complex web of
interfirm credit which links the fortunes of efficient and inefficient
enterprises, are major obstacles to a successful transformation. They may
result in a "bad" equilibrium in which socially profitable long-term
investments are crowded out by less profitable short-term investments. Such
a "bad" equilibrium could arise if potential lenders lack the confidence
that other lenders will stand ready to extend credit to cover enterprises'
liquidity needs. This lack of confidence may especially prevail in PCPEs
since there the information concerning the risk characteristics of specific
enterprises ia missing or is not widely available to potential lenders.
In addition to the lack of information about specific firma, the POPEs
exhibit a relatively high degree of economy-wide (systemic) risk due to the
large structural changes and the unpredictability of the policy response.
The likelihood of systemic risk is enhanced in POPEs since their capital- 11-
marketsare underdeveloped: risk which could be diversified in fully-
developed capital markers may remain undiversified. Furthermore, the
network of interfirm credit increases the risk that firm-specific shocks are
spread across enterprises and, thereby, are transformed into economy-wide
shocks. All of these factors taken together contribute to shortening the
planning horizon of lenders and borrowers, and account for the tendency to
undertake short-term rather than long-term investment projects (like
infrastructure investment)--even though the latter might be more desirable
from the social point of view. Thus, a "bad" equilibrium ensues.
4.Removing the obstacles
The preceding discussion indicates that a major obstacle hindering
transformation end yielding a "bed" equilibrium is the underdevelopment of
capital markets. Policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of a "bad"
equilibrium include measures that (i) improve the information system and the
legal instruments available to lenders and investors, and "clean" the
balance sheets of enterprises and banks from "bad" debts, and (ii) enhance
credibility. In what follows, we address these issues.
a. "Cleaning" the balance sheets
An improved information system provides a better assessment of
creditworthiness of individual firms and thereby removes an important
obstacle to lending. The development of a legal framework provides the
instruments for the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property
rights, thus removing another important obstacle to lending. Furthermore,
the protection provided by the legal system encourages prospective lenders
to engage in ventures that are socially desirable but that are deemed to be- 12-
toorisky in the absence of the legal safety net. Put differently, the
legal protection reduces the need of prospective lenders to engage in self-
insurance by the accumulation of "excessive" (and socially-costly)
information.
Finding appropriate ways to "clean" the balance sheets of enterprises
and banks from "bad" debts would delink the fortunes of enterprises that
ought to go out of business from those that should continue operations (see
Brainard (1991)). A major challenge is to achieve this objective without
imposing excessive costs to the budget and without hampering the incentive
structure. The "cleaning" of books can be effected through either a
cancellation or a socialization of debts. In doing so care should be taken
to avoid the "moral hazard" that "cleaning" operations may introduce into
the capital market.
Debt cancellation reduces the availability of working capital to
creditor firma, and carries with it the danger of choking "good" enterprises
whose cash-flow requirements depend critically on debt-service receipts.
The government should consider, therefore, extending credits to such "good"
firms. The identification of creditworthy economically-viable enterprises
should be made simpler once the balance sheets have been "cleaned."
An additional difficulty with debt cancellation is that it may give
rise to moral hazard problems. To avoid setting the precedent that
interenterprise debts are not honored and are cancelable in what may seem to
be mn arbitrary manner, it is critical that this operation be viewed as a
pure book-keeping device. In fact, since in many cases (prior to
privatization) the debtor and creditor enterprises are not privately owned,- 13-
thecancellation of interenterprise debts need not alter the distribution of
income and wealth within the private sector. It could be argued, therefore,
that such a cleaning operation helps to reduce the "moral hazard" that might
be present once the enterprises, whose balance sheets are heavily loaded
with such debts, are privately owned.
Delinking the fortunes of debtor and creditor enterprises through debt
socialization, transforms the nature of debt and alters its risk
characteristics without changing its magnitude. In socializing the debt,
the government engages in debt-for-debt swaps in which government
obligations (e.g., treasury bills) are swapped for the claims that creditor
firms end banks hold against other enterprises. In a sense, this operation
serves to recapitalize creditor firms and banks by issuing government
obligations in place of the non-performing assets. At the same time, the
liabilities of debtor firms to other enterprises and banks are transformed
into liabilities to the government. By assuming the role of a financial
intermediary, the government (directly, or indirectly through a bank acting
on its behalf) helps to delink the fortunes of different enterprises. By
servicing its owndebt,the government ensures that the availability of
working capital for the creditor enterprise does not depend upon the debtor
enterprise's capacity to pay. However, to secure its own capacity to pay
when debtor enterprises get into debt-service difficulties, the government
must have overcome an important obstacle: it must have at its disposal a
functional tax system capable of financing the debt-service obligations
without resorting to inflationary finance. This underscores the urgency of
an early development of an efficient tax system.- 14-
Inanalogy with the earlier discussion of debt cancellations, it could
be argued that the socialization of debt may also introduce "moral hazard"
problems. For, a precedent may be set that the government steps in to bail
out firma in financial difficulties, thereby reducing the incentives for
firma to run their affairs prudently. However, as indicated earlier, prior
to privatization the various enterprises are, in fact, owned by the
government; therefore, the socialization of debt amounts to making explicit
what is already implicit. Indeed, one of the benefits of undertaking debt
socialization prior to privatization is that it reduces the risk that moral-
hazard problems would arise in the post-privatization stage.
A successful program of "cleaning" the balance sheets reduces the
difficulties in pricing enterprises. This removes an important obstacle to
an effective privatization program and enables the PCPE to reap the benefits
from privatization. The beneficial effects of privatization on the
efficiency of resource allocation may be significant if the privatization of
state enterprises and the housing sector provides incentives for higher
productivity and better maintenance of the capital stock. Such benefits are
especially pronounced in PCPEs where, as argued above, domestic credit
markets are in their infancy. In this regard, the opening of the economy to
foreign investment can be highly beneficial. In addition to providing
financial and managerial capital, privatization programs that encourage
direct foreign participation can be useful in providing access to
international capital markets. Foreign investors bring with them know-how,
contacts, and information. Their presence and active participation yield
the added benefit of improving the functioning of domestic capital markets.- 15-
b.Enhancine credibility
A major obstacle to a successful transformation is the lack of
credibility. To acquire credibility, policymakers must demonstrate that
they are willing to introduce a fundamental change in the manner by which
policy is conducted. The adoption of a rule-based policy framework, rather
than discretion, might reduce the perception of arbitrariness and, thereby,
strengthen confidence in the policy-msking process.
The sdvsntsges of rules (especially those that are simple and not
excessively state-contingent) over discretion are particularly pronounced in
PCPEs in which policymakers start giving a greater role to market signals.
In this environment, discretionary actions may be counterproductive, since
the structure of prices and other market signals reflect the prevailing
distortions. Therefore, there is the danger that the discretionary actions
are guided by the wrong signals. Policy rules that are simple sre
especially desirable where policymakers are untested. Furthermore, since in
the CPEs discretion was the rule, a clear statement favoring rules over
discretion could go a long way in signalling a basic change in the policy
regime. The key challenge however, is how to make such a statement
credible.
Two elements of credibility are needed. First, the economic program
must be credible. The program should be feasible, stand the test of
professional scrutiny, and reflect the experience of and lessons from other
episodes. Second, policy commitments must be credible. These commitments
should not be susceptible to the "time inconsistency" problem, providing
incentives to chsnge policy direction in mid-course. Economic authorities- 16-
makeexplicit or implicit pronouncements that influence the response of the
private sector. In this sense, policymakers are the "dominant player" in
the economic arena. The private sector shapes its economic behavior on the
basis of expectations concerning the likely course of current end future
policies. With the passage of time, the government, observing the behavior
of the private sector, may be tempted to depart from the previously-
announced policy intentions which, in turn, have governed the private
sector's actions. This is the well-known "time inconsistency" problem which
may hsmper the credibility of policy commitments.
The two elements of credibility- -of the economic program and of the
policy commitments--are interdependent. For exsmple, the likelihood that
policy commitments may face "time inconsistency" problems incresses, the
higher is the credibility of the economic transformation program. For, a
credible transformation program is likely to result in short-term hardships.
It is liable, therefore, to generate political pressures and interest groups
lobbying for mid-course changes, which may give rise to "time
inconsistency." This possibility, in turn, msy be anticipated by the
private sector already in the earlier stages of the economic transformation
process, mnd incorporated into its behavior. If this occurs, then market
participants may end up giving excessive attention to the near term while
discounting heavily longer-term prospects- -thus generating a "bad"
equilibrium. To avoid such difficulties and enhance the likelihood that s
"good" equilibrium ensues, policymakers may find it useful to "tie" their
own hands end thereby send a strong signal that the advantages of being the
"dominant player" will not be used.- 17-
Itis useful to classify the methods by which the authorities can "tie"
their own hands into four categories. First, the esrly steps of the new
policy regime must entail actions that are sufficiently significant to
provide a clear signal that a change in regime has occurred. Policy
pronouncements accompanied by actions indicating that the commitment of the
government to the transformation is "absolute" make policy reversals
politically costly. The higher the political coats of policy reversals, the
higher the credibility of policy pronouncements. Once a credible signal is
provided, it would influence the expectations of the private sector about
the future course of the new policy regime and, in forming such expectations
the private sector is likely to lower the weight given to past policy
failures. Thus, the quick building of a track record imposes internal
moliticel constraints on the ability of the government to reverse course.
Second, the various branches of the policy-making apparatus can be
designed so as to provide effective checks and balances protecting from
"time inconsistency" problems. Examples are the establishment of a legally
independent Central Bank, or a legal prohibition on Central Bank financing
of government budget deficits, or a Constitutional amendment legislating
balanced budgets. Such mechanisms contribute to the credibility of policy
commitments by imposing internal lemal constraints on the ability of
governments to abuse their 'dominant player" role.
Third, the credibility of policy commitments can also be enhanced if
the government "ties" its hands by entering into international agreements of
various sorts. Examples are exchange-rate conanitaenta, like those
undertaken by countries joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the- 18-
EuropeanMonetary System, or like those undertaken by countries joining the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (CAn). These commitments impose
external legal conatraints on the use of specific policy instruments: the
exchange rate in the case of the ERM, and tariffs or quotas in the case of
the CAfl.
Fourth, credibility can be further enhanced if the government chooses
to "tie" its hands by adopting an economic program supported by an
international financial institution, like the International Monetary Fund or
the World Bank. The endorsement of experts representing the international
financial community enhances the credibility of the economic program.
Furthermore, by making the financial support to the program conditional on
the implementation of the prespecified policy measures, this form of
"tieing" the hands imposes external economic and leaal constraints, and
contributes to the credibility of policy commitments.
The foregoing four methods by which the government can "tie" its hands
are not mutually exclusive. In many cases governments may find it useful to
employ some or all of these methods simultaneously so as to reinforce each
other and enhance credibility. In thia regard, however, the capacity of
PCPEs to employ the internal (political and legal) constraints is somewhat
limited. In these cases, therefore, the external constraints should play a
more prominent role in "tieing" governments' hands.
5.Capital markets, price reform, monetary policy
and trade liberalization
In previous sections we have claimed that the underdevelopment of
capital markets in PCPEa is an obstacle hampering the success of the- 19-
transformationprogram. We have also identified measures that would enhance
the development of such markets. In this section, we argue that improving
the functioning of capital markets also enhance the benefits from other key
elements of the transforeation program. This point is illustrated by
reference to price reform, monetary policy and trade liberalization.
The removal of subsidies, the freeing-up of prices end the dismantling
of administered-pricing machinery is likely to result in a higher price
level. Coupled with the tightened credit control and the segmentation of
the underdeveloped domestic credit markets, such price rise may have
profound negative supply-side effects. For, as noted earlier, in PCPEs the
ability of enterprises to offset the rise in input prices, and the
consequent fall in working capital by employing alternative sources of
finance, is limited. Therefore, great care should be taken to ensure that
"good" enterprises can replenish their eroded working capital so as to
maintain their productive activities during the price-reform period. Thus,
well-functioning capital markets enhance the benefits from price
liberalization.
An early development of domestic capital markets also enhances the
effectiveness of monetary policy. By its nature, monetary policy has
aggregate effects on the economy. These effects impact on "good" and "bad"
firms alike. Well-functioning credit markets, however, facilitates a
separation between "good" and "bad" firms. While "good" firms can mitigate
the contractionary effects of monetary policy by relying on other sources of
finance, "bad" firms cannot. The latter do not have access to capital
markets and, therefore, they must either cease operations or restructure.- 20-
Accordingly,the capacity of monetary policy (which ia inherently unrefined)
to yield socially desirable outcomes is enhanced if it operates in an
environment of well-functioning capital markets. In addition, the
restructuring of capital markets should enhance the incentiva effects of
monetary and credit policies. Once enterprises are aware that access to
credit markets is limited and that credits can only be obtained by "good"
firms, it is likely that they will respond more promptly and effectively to
signals conveyed by monetary and credit policies.
The benefits from trade liberalization also depend on the quality of
capital markets. Trade liberalization provides the economy with the "right"
price signals. Exposure to world prices helps to demonopolize the economy,
enhance competition, and improve the allocation of resources. However, in
adjusting to the removal of protection, even "good" and economically viable
firms may require credit. The adoption of "hard" budget constraints
eliminates the automatic financing of enterprises' deficits by the
government. Without sufficient access to capital markets such "good" firms
may be forced out of business, thereby reducing the benefits from trade
liberalization. Moreover, in attempting to protect themselves, the "good"
but endangered enterprises may be tempted to join the "bad" and economically
non-viable enterprises in lobbying against trade liberalization, thereby
reducing the likelihood that liberalization will be adopted. Furthermore,
for trade liberalization to succeed in providing the "discipline" of world
prices, unconstrained imports and exports should be permitted. Accordingly,
a significant degree of current-account convertibility should be adopted.
To enable the introduction of such convertibility, the financial system- 21-
needsto be functional. These considerations imply that the benefits from,
and support for, trade liberalization can be enhanced by well-functioning
domestic capital markets.
6. Sequencing and safety nets
Attaining the conditions conducive to a transformation of a "bad"
equilibrium into a "good" equilibrium, is not an easy task. Many obstacles
need to be removed. Interest groups are well entrenched, the legal system
protecting private ownership and property rights is not fully developed,
managerial and technical know-how is limited, the banking system is
underdeveloped, and the fiscal and monetary systems are ineffective. In
addition, experience with the operation and "rules of game" of a market
economy is lacking, and policy credibility can only be earned over time.
The foregoing difficulties have stimulated interest in the analysis of
the optimal pace and sequence of economic reform measures (see, for example,
Dornbusch (1990), Fischer and Geib (1990), Kornai (1990), Marer (1990) and
McKinnon (1991)). Experience suggests, however, that there is a danger that
a lengthy search for a perfect sequence of economic measures under
conditions of fast-changing circumstances, may result in the adoption of
outdated and irrelevant policies. Rather, it might be preferable to adopt a
timely, albeit somewhat imperfect, comprehensive reform program than to
search the "perfect" fine-tuned sequence of policy actions.
In practice, however, there are circumstances in which the adoption of
a rapid and comprehensive reform are impeded by a significant obstacle: the
political support necessary for the adoption of such a program is lacking,
thereby reducing its credibility. Without credibility, it may not be- 22
desirable to undertake the "first-best" program, since the lack of
credibility amounts to a distortion, and calls for an application of the
theory of the "second best" (Calvo (1989)). Thus, choices need to be mmdc
as to the appropriata pace and sequence of reform measures. In this regard,
thare is no aeneral blueprint. Indeed, the basic insight of the theory of
the second best implies that the optimal pace and sequence of reform
measures depends on circumstances, and those, in turn, differ across
countries. These circumstances reflect diversities of historical
backgrounds, economic, legal, and political institutions, entrepreneurial
traditions, as well as attitudes towards the role of markets and incentives.
Since credibility plays a critical role in determining the succeas of
the economic transformation program, it is important that the measures
implemented early in the sequence ara backed by a broad-based political
support. To secure such support, the positive results of these measures
should be quickly visible, and the appropriate "safety nets" necesaary to
protect the weak segments of society ahould be in place. These
considerations explain why economic transformation programs adopted by high-
inflation countries (like Poland in 1990), should give high priority to
achieving macroeconomic stabilization.
In choosing safety nets, additional obstacles need to be overcome. In
addition to minimizing the welfare cost of taxation and income transfers,
the safety nets should not interfere with monetary and exchange rate
policies. In this regard, policies affecting the levels of interest rates
and the exchange rate should not be held hoataga to the objectives of
protecting specific sectors in the economy. Likewise, the benefits from the- 23-
safetynat of wage indexation should be weighed against the cost of
stimulating inflation. In general, expenditures associated with all safety
nets should not impede macroeconomic stability: these expenditures should
be accounted for, and be an explicit part of the budget process.
In previous sections, we have argued that the success of economic
transformation in PCPEs hinges on the presence of well-functioning capital
markets. We have also argued that an early development of such markets is
desirable, as it removes numerous obstacles, Ideally, therefore, like
macroeconomic stability, financial-markets reform should also be given high
priority in the sequence of transformation measures. However, since
credibility plays a unique role in financial markets, the lack of
credibility is an obstacle hindering such reform. Therefore, a complete
reform of the financial market may need to await the buildup of credibility.
In this regard, however, a distinction should be made between liberalization
of transactions in the domestic capital market and in the external one. The
vulnerability of the latter to incomplete credibility is particularly acute
in economies undergoing transformation. This explains why the opening of
the capital account of the balance of payment (the adoption of capital-
account convertibility) should be undertaken late in the sequence of policy
measures, after trade liberalization (see, Edwards (1985) and Frenkel
(1983)).
The focus of this paper has been on obstacles prominent during the
early stages of economic transformation. Excluded are obstacles prominent
in the late stages of transformation- -those that impede the resumption of
sustainable growth (for an analysis of this issue, see Calvo and Frenkel
(l99lb))- 24-
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